Amnesty as a Panacea for the Resolution of Resource Control Conflicts in Nigeria's Niger Delta Region

Fatile, Jacob Olufemi
Department of Public Administration
Lagos State University
Lagos, Nigeria
jacofem@yahoo.com

Abstract—**The objective of this paper is to determine the extent to which the implementation of the amnesty programme in the Nigeria's Niger Delta region has reduced the incidence of militancy insurrection and conflicts in the area. The paper adopted qualitative approach and relies on secondary data, using the combination of analytical and descriptive method to assess the effects of amnesty programme in the resolution of resource control conflicts in Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The paper observes that in spite of the implementation of the Amnesty programme by various civilian administrations since 2008, recent reports demonstrate that militancy and the attendant consequences are still being experienced in the region. The paper submits that unless the factors causing violent conflicts in the region such as marginalisation, environmental degradation, inequitable distribution of oil revenues and underdevelopment are addressed; the present peace in the region may not subsist for long. It recommends measures for successful implementation of amnesty in order to achieve relative peace in the region in particular and Nigeria as a whole.**

Keyword: **Amnesty, Resource Control, Conflict Resolution, conflict transformation, Militants, Niger Delta**

I. INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is a federation of thirty six states. The Niger Delta region of the country consists of the oil producing states which include Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Ondo and Rivers states. In most developed federation f the world where true federalism is practiced, each component unit of the federation are allowed to control the resources accruing in each of their region. However, the situation in Nigeria is quite different and this has resulted in violent conflicts arising from agitation for resource control by the oil producing communities. Niger Delta region is an environment that has been severely degraded with its attendant negative physical and socioeconomic consequences has been a major source of constant struggles by the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region that eventually put them at loggerheads with the Nigerian government and the oil multinational corporations (Badmus, 2010). The ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta region are restive over what they consider as years of neglect and misuse of oil revenue derived from their soil by the state and its petro-business partner- the oil corporations (Ibeanu, 1999, Olojede, Fajonyomi, Akhakpe & Mudasiru, 2000). The oil producing communities are worried over the effects of oil production activities and other forms of environmental degradation which have had negative impact on crops, water, fishes and other aquatic animals. It is instructive to note that the while conflicts attendant on oil pollution and other environmental stresses continue to be on the rise, state conceptions of security which emphasize militarist approach to the resolution of conflicts in the oil communities exacerbate the frustrations of the people and disperse the situation toward crisis. Successive governments have over the years recognized the fact that the crisis in the Niger Delta does pose a threat to the security, unity and territorial integrity of the Nigerian state, the lives and property of the residents of the region and the booming petro-business which has direct link or bearing with the national economy. Thus, various approaches have been adopted by government to curb the crisis.

Yet, the crisis remains unabated. The Niger Delta people have been in the agitation for justice for over four decades, but the turning point in the crisis came with the introduction of the amnesty programme by Yar'Adua administration (Agbegbedia, 2014). The federal government's amnesty programme introduced in October, 2009 was borne out of the "doctrine of necessity" resulting from the militants' disruption of crude oil, vandalization of oil pipeline and gas installations, and kidnapping of foreign oil company workers (Etekpe, 2012).

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Nigerian government has made trillions of dollars from oil revenue in the last half a century for oil exploitation in the Niger Delta. Despite this huge amount of money and the seemingly inexhaustible resource potentials of the Niger Delta, the people of the region remain in abject poverty and deprivation of the basic needs of life. In spite of being Africa's leading oil producing zone, the world development report shows that 36.4% of Niger Delta inhabitants live below poverty line and 70.2% of this proportion earn less than $1USD *per* day with a clear absence of the basic social amenities (Balouga, 2009; World Bank, 2003).

IJBAMR

Niger Delta conflicts stem from the failure of the past and present remediation options employed in error by the various state actors at different point in time. The federal government in an attempt to end violent conflicts in the region as well as prevent the bombings and vandalization of oil and gas facilities has adopted the military option at different point in time. The region of Nigeria has in recent years been a hotbed of conflicts and embroiled in turmoil over the struggle for the control of the vast resources of the region. Lessons of the futility of favouring forceful seizure of oil to the detriment of the host communities are replete in many scenarios including the experience of the western powers during the 1973 global oil crises when the United States tried to use force to seize the Arab oil well following a meltdown of diplomatic relations. The United States of America failed in its efforts because the Arab nations unanimously agreed to punish the West by raising the price of crude oil from $3 per barrel to $5.1 per barrel.

As a result of the harsh federal government policies since the discovery of crude oil in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria in 1956, about 20 separate militant groups have emerged to disrupt oil pipelines and kidnapped the oil workers. The latest to emerge among these groups is the Niger Delta Avengers which is said to have been responsible for blowing up oil and gas installations in the country since the month of April, 2016 to date. This had pushed the nation's crude production to the lowest in 20 years.

This development has an adverse effect on revenue for the oil-dependent country. The agitations by the militants peaked in 2008 and literally "forced" the government to reverse its policy of counter-insurgence to that of amnesty on 4 October, 2009 for the Niger Delta militants. It is instructive to note that despite the adoption of the amnesty programme, the clamour for resource control in the region continued unabated. The conflict among factional militant leaders on government programmes has also led to resurgence of militancy in the region and at at the first quarter of 2016, oil production has gone down to less than 1 million barrel per day which has negative consequences of the finance of the nation's budget.

Although several studies have been conducted on the issue of resource control and the Niger Delta, limited research had been carried out on the relationship between Amnesty programme and resource control conflicts in the region. This obvious gap in knowledge in the extant literature is what this current research intend to fill.

III. OBJECTIVE OF THE PAPER

This paper seeks to examine the extent to which amnesty programme introduced by the Nigerian government has impacted on the resolution of resource control conflicts in the Nigeria's Niger Delta region.

IV. METHODOLOGY

This paper is purely qualitative in its methodological thrust and it focuses on secondary data. It relied on relevant extbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, official publications etc.

V. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL EXPLICATIONS

The paper explains the concepts of amnesty and conflicts. Derived from the Greek word '*amnestia',* amnesty means 'pardon', especially for those who have committed political crime. It is a period during which crimes can be admitted or illegal weapons handed in without prosecution (Agbegbedia, 2014). In the view of Ikelegbe (2010), an amnesty is a guarantee of exemption from prosecution and pardon from punishment for certain criminal, rebel and insurgent actions hitherto committed usually against the state. Amnesty as described by Otite & Umukoro (2010) is a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme. The amnesty program is a social change effort aimed at improving the lot of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region, with the ultimate goal and aim to restore peace and achieve enduring stability within the region (Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012).

The debate as to what constitute conflicts is far from settled (Emuedo, 2013). Conflict exist where there is interaction between at least two individuals or groups whose objectives differ (Nicholson, 1971). This paper define conflict as a struggle over values, claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the 'opposing' parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralise, injure or eliminate rivals.

The theoretical foundation adopted in this paper is conflict transformation theory. The central argument of conflict transformation theory is that contemporary violent conflict requires something more than a mere changing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes. It acknowledges that the very structure of parties and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict (Maill, 2004). This theory assumes that conflict is a result of serious problems of injustice and inequality expressed by competing social, cultural and economic frameworks. It is obvious; therefore, that conflict transformation through the granting of amnesty is crucial for conflict resolution in the Niger Delta.

VI. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS

Nigeria's Niger Delta region is a geopolitical zone which is the main centre of Nigeria's oil industry (Etemike, 2012). Nigeria's Niger Delta comprises of nine states of the current thirty six states of the federation. These states are Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers (Asuni, 2009). The Niger Delta is a zone of demographic minorities and at the same instance accounts for more than 80% of earning from oil and gas, of federally distributed revenue in Nigeria. The area harbors over 95 percent of Nigeria's crude oil and gas resources, which accounts for 90 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings. As at 2003, Nigeria's crude oil reserve in the Niger

IJBAMR

Delta stood at 33 billion barrels, while the natural gas reserve was 160 trillion cu.ft (Agbegbedia, 2014; Onuoha, 2004). In spite of the Niger Delta's dominant contribution to the national economy, the region is characterized by underemployment, pollution, extreme poverty, neglect, underdevelopment, and lack of proper and adequate infrastructure (Amadi & Abdullah, 2012; Anele & Omoro, 2012). The long years of neglect and deprivation, coupled with insensitivity of successive governments and the oil companies, had by the late 1990s created a volatile atmosphere characterized by protests, agitations and conflicts (Duru & Ogbonnaya, 2012).

Researchers on Niger Delta described the current state of the region in various forms. For example, Idowu (2012) described the region as the goose that lays the golden egg but the most environmentally fragile. Badmus (2010) described the region as experiencing the so-called paradoxes of the plenty. To Nte, Eke & Anele (2010) it is one of the most insecure places in the world. In the view of Okpara (2012), the gas deposits and abundant oil, which should have been a blessing in the Niger Delta region, are now referred to as the oil curse, while Paki & Ebienfa (2011) referred to the region as one of the least developed parts of the nation.

The restiveness and subsequent militant struggle *of* the people in the Niger Delta are the direct result of historical deprivation, neglect, oppression and dispossession of the regions natural endowment (Odubo & Tobor, 2016). The crises in the Niger Delta manifests in various ways namely, militancy, hostage taking and kidnapping of oil workers and frequent disruption of oil production activities through the destruction of oil and gas installations and facilities. Prominent among the militant groups operating in the region are the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) led by Henry Okah, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo, the Niger Delta Vigilante force (NDVF) led by Ateke Tom, the Bush Boys, the Martyrs Brigade and the Avengers among others. These militant groups have carried out deadly and paralyzing attacks on oil and gas facilities with their weapons (Duru & Ogbonnaya, 2012).

Over the years, the Nigerian government has adopted several policies and implemented different developmental and poverty alleviation programs aimed at enhancing socioeconomic development, eradicating or alleviating poverty in the Niger Delta region (Amadi & Abdullah, 2012). While some of these government initiatives and development projects are laudable, they have however failed to achieve enduring peace in the region. The crises in the region led to the enactment of the Act for the Establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). This is because of the vacuum created by the abolition of the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1999 (Ukiwo, 2015). Yar'Adua administration introduced the Amnesty program in 2009 as a means to create an enabling and peaceful environment to address the developmental issues and problems of the Niger Delta region (Akanji & Oyitso, 2012; Idowu, 2012). It is instructive to note that most of these initiatives have been hijacked by the leaders in the region, politicians for their own selfish interests.

VII. RESOURCES CONTROL AND CONFLICTS IN THE NIGER-DELTA

The quest for resource control by the people of the Niger Delta lies at the heart of the violence in the region. Resource control is essentially based on claims of ownership, access and equity, and refers to the desire that the region be left to manage its natural resources, particularly its oil, and pay taxes and/or royalties to the federal government (Ako, 2011).

Sampson (2013) observes that the Niger Delta struggle is motivated by the demand for resource control and equitable wealth distribution and protest against the flagrant and damaging (ecological) activities of oil multinational companies (MNCs) operating in the region. Decades of oil exploitation, environmental degradation and state neglect as noted by Ikelegbe (2005) has created an impoverished, marginalised and exploited citizenry (leading to) a resistance of which the youth has been a vanguard.

Thus, Niger Deltans believed very strongly that the only way violent conflicts can be averted in the region is for them to be able to control the resources being generated in the region. They are uncomfortable with the present arrangement where the federal government is in charge of resources being generated from each of the component units and the only benefit that accrues to the regions generating the resources is a percentage allocation based on derivation principle.

VIII. THE CONTEXTS AND CONTENTS OF THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME

The decades of violence in the Niger Delta region has prompted several initiatives aimed at addressing the causes of unrest in the region. In spite of the contributions of these initiatives, the crisis appears to have persisted which points to the fact that the initiatives have failed to satisfactorily solve the problems in the Niger Delta.

With the return to democratic governance in 1999, efforts at providing conducive atmosphere for foreign investment, opening democratic space and reducing the magnitude of conflicts if not totally eliminating it, appeared to be a major concern of Nigerian people. Thus, Obasanjo's administration established Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) as a specialized agency to cater for development and transformation of the region. Also, the Ministry of Niger Delta was created. While it would be stated that the NDDC provided number of infrastructures, its activities appeared not to have successfully reduced or eliminated criminality, violence and militant confrontation in the Niger Delta. Even the Federal government decision to engage a minimum force of action by establishing a Joint Military Task Force (JTF) is a testimony to the fact that the problem is still rearing its ugly head. Indeed, the aforementioned efforts seem to have rather increased the complexity of the crisis in Niger Delta (Nnorom & Odigbo, 2015).

IJBAMR

Given the access the militants had to illicit revenues from 'blood oil,' the militants seemed to be at a relative advantage in weapons procurement (Hazen & Horner 2007). The fact that militants were relatively well-armed and that Nigeria's military response drew a lot of criticism by the international community because of alleged human rights violations has compounded the restiveness and crises in the region. The Yar'Adua administration worried about the conflict in the region and the continuous decline of the country's revenue due to disruption of oil production decided to enter into dialogue with the militants in the Niger Delta (Asuni 2009; Sayne 2013). In June, 2009, the Late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua unveiled an Amnesty Programme for militants in the region. The central objective of the Programme is that the Federal Government will grant amnesty to any militant willing to come out of the regions' million-square-mile network of oil-ladden creeks and swamps, turn in his weapon and accept a US$13 daily stipend in exchange. It is estimated that between 10,000 to 25,000 militants surrendered their weapons at the end of the Amnesty Programme which lasted from August to October, 2009 (Duru & Ogbonnaya, 2012).

According to Oluduro & Oluduro (2012), the amnesty program was to be implemented in three phases: the disarmament and demobilization of the youthful militants; the integration and rehabilitation of the ex-militants; and the final phase, which is the post-amnesty initiative that promotes massive infrastructural development within the region. The responses of militants to the offer of amnesty were mixed. Ikelegbe (2010) observed that while some eagerly embraced it, others foot-dragged expecting the government to implement the full course of recommendations proposed by the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta. For instance, MEND initially rejected the amnesty offer but declared a thirty days ceasefire in July 2009 after the release of one its leaders Henry Orkar by the Federal Government. However, at the expiration of the window period, 20,192 persons and the major militant groups had accepted the offer of amnesty and submitted about 20,000 items of ammunition (Kuku, 2012).

IX. THE INFLUENCE OF AMNESTY PROGRAMME ON MILITANCY INSURRECTION IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION

The introduction of the amnesty witnessed a significant attainment of peace and security within the region. Moruku (2012) maintained that this was the period when an uneasy calm reigned within the region as a result of the temporary cease-fire declared by the armed militant groups amidst the offer of amnesty. The amnesty program gave the region a new lease of life and presented the country with a positive image among the comity of nations. The ex-militants willingness to embrace the amnesty programme can be seen in their wholesome renunciation of militancy, surrender of arms and agreement to cease hostilities in the creeks (Agbegbedia, 2014).

Amnested Militants in the Niger Delta, December 2009

S/N	States	Gender		Total
		Male	Female	
1	Abia	155	8	**163**
2	Bayelsa	8.900	117	**9,017**
3	Rivers	8,963	89	**9.052**
4	Akwa-Ibom	571	29	**600**
5	Cross River	159	1	**160**
6	Edo	400	0	**450**
7	Delta	4,396	20	**4,416**
8	Imo	297	3	**300**
9	Ondo	3,198	2	**2,200**
Total		**26,089**	**272**	**26,361**

Source: Amnesty Office, Abuja, 2010 cited in Etekpe, 2012

Arms handed over to Government by Militants in Bayelsa and Rivers States 20 August, 2009.

Town, State	Quantity and categories of arms							
	Guns	*Riffles*	*MB*	*GB*	*GPMG*	*G*	*RL*	*Others, bullets, etc*
Yenagoa, Bayelsa State	***520***	***385***	***79***	***18***	***108***	***107***	***17***	***95,970***
Port-Harcourt, Rivers State	***35***	***109***	***50***	***6***	***34***	***60***	***3***	***23,023***
Total	***555***	***494***	***129***	***24***	***142***	***167***	***20***	***118,993***

Source: Ogbonaya (2009). This Day, November 1:12, pp. 14 and 34. Cited in Etekpe, 2012

Key

MB	**Mort. Bombs**
GB	**Gun Boats**
GPMG	**General purpose machine guns**
G	**Grenads**
RL	**Rocket launchers**

In his own record, Ifeatu (2010) also indicated that arms surrendered included 287,445 different types of ammunitions, with about 2,760 assorted arms, 18 gunboats, 763 dynamites, 1,090 dynamite caps, 3,155 magazines and other accessories like RPG charger, 1 bullet proof jacket, walkie-talkies, dynamite cables, cartridges, knives and AK 47 bayonets. A breakdown of the submission showed that 82,406 ammunitions were received from Rivers State, 52,958 from Delta, 139,877 from Bayelsa, 9,748 from Cross River, 9,725 from Ondo, 959 from Akwa Ibom as well as 722 from Edo State.

IJBAMR

X. PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FACING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME IN NIGERIA.

The amnesty initiative generated controversy from various quarters. While some think amnesty has been a success, others think it has not succeeded at all (Uduagban, 2009; Jega, 2009; Ofehe, 2009). It is on record that over 26,358 militants were disarmed and rehabilitated while over 10,395 militants were trained under the Yar'adua/Jonathan civilian administration. Not only that oil production went up from I million in 2009 to 2.6 million bpd following the introduction of the amnesty programme. With all these developments, it may not be out of place to argue that the amnesty programme was successful at least immediately after its iintroduction.

Ogege (2011) however, observed that the federal government implementation of the amnesty initiative was merely a superficial and well thought out ploy that was purposely designed to trick the militants into surrendering their arms. Amnesty programme, no doubt, has considerably improved peace and security in the Niger Delta, but the implementation of the amnesty programme has not transcended beyond the collection of weapons to providing sustainable livelihood alternatives to ex-militants and affected Niger Delta communities (Agbegbedia, 2014). However, Ajaero (2010) seems to capture these positions well when he argues that:

For those who actually know the cost of violence and the quantity of arms and ammunition in the region, the decision of the repentant militants to embrace peace is one of the best things that have happened to the country in 2009. A state of war has been averted by their decision to lay down arms. This is a great act of patriotism. In fact for laying down their arms, the Niger Delta militants were voted man of the year 2009 (Ajaero, 2010).

It must be acknowledged that the Amnesty Programme remains one of the most realistic efforts by any government in Nigeria to address and ease the unrest in the Niger Delta region, although the Programme has come under criticisms for not seeking permanent solutions to the region's underlying problems. While some have criticized the Programme for doing "little to address the core causes of militancy and criminality that have plagued the Niger Delta for decades, such as lack of education, jobs and basic services" (Connors & Swartz, 2009). For instance, there is lack of meaningful social economic development in the region. The East-West road project that has been under construction for so many years is yet to be completed. Also, a few jobs were created for the militants and others. Besides, an estimated two-third of the amnesty budget went into private pockets. Other critics question the viability of the Amnesty Programme as a crisis management strategy (Duru & Ogbonnaya, 2012). Many real militants did not surrender their arms and ammunitions during the amnesty programme because the Nigerian State officials seemed to have neglected the plight of the Niger Delta people. This has resulted in frustration, anger and resort to alternative measures.

The amnesty has been faulted due to its poor implementation. Bassey explained that amnesty alone does not address the core issues such as injustice and underdevelopment of the region that precipitated the revolt in the first place. While Akpan & Ering (2010) emphasized that the amnesty policy was not geared towards addressing the social, economic, political, and environmental problems that were the main drivers of the conflict, but rather designed to enable the federal government unimpeded access to gas and oil resources. In the view of Ukiwo (2015), amnesty programme is perceived to have performed poorly in terms of delivery of human security in the region. The incidences of piracy, oil theft, arms proliferation, and kidnapping have increased since the introduction of the amnesty programme.

Duru & Ogbonnaya (2012) observed that while the Amnesty Programme is in progress, the environmental and ecological devastation of the Niger Delta region by the oil multinationals remains unabated and unresolved. The paltry financial rewards granted to militants during amnesty are incomparable with huge amount of money that accrues to them during illegal oil bunkering, hostage taking and other violent activities.

XI. CONCLUSION

Nigeria's amnesty programme is a bold and unprecedented move to restore stability in oil output and revenues that arise from the turbulent Niger Delta region, which are central to the current system of resource appropriation (Vanessa, 2013). It has been demonstrated that amnesty positively contributes towards peace building in the Niger Delta, although it has some negative connotations for ex-militants. The almost whole scale embrace of the amnesty by the repentant militants has been a great relief for Nigerians. However, the amnesty programme may not provide a lasting solution to crisis in the region (Egwemi, 2010; Adaramola, 2009). In fact, the adoption of amnesty without ensuring accelerated empowerment of all communities in the Niger Delta casts some doubts on the state interest in the region (Akinwale, 2010).

Based on the findings from of this research, it is appropriate to conclude that the amnesty programme, though was successful to a large extent in restoring relative peace to the region, has not provided a permanent solution to the problem in the Niger Delta region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There is need for the involvement of all the stakeholders in the region, most especially traditional rulers, prominent Ijaw leaders as well as politicians and other stakeholders in the reconstructing and revitalizing the region economically, socially, and in creating an enabling environment that will help in the reorientation of the ex-militants/agitators and to accommodate the graduates of the Amnesty program. Peace committees and traditional rulers should be actively involved in dialogue and negotiation with the militants in order to restore peace to the oil region. There is a need for proper implementation of true fiscal federalism in Nigeria. Revising revenue derivation and proper federal structure to accommodate and represent all the regions of the country

IJBAMR

will immensely help in solving this problem. In fact, the call for restructuring of the Nigerian federation is key to the resolution of conflicts in the region. Unless this is done, marginalized voices would continue to rise against being treated as second class citizens in their own country.

Also, sustainable peace in the Niger Delta would be achieved if the living standards of the majority of people in the region drastically improve. Emphasis should be placed on the provision of modern technological facilities and social welfare package that can transform the region from its present situation to an industrial area. There is a possibility of peace if there is genuine development in the area and job creation. Pressures should also be mounted on elected government officials for accountability.

Finally, the Federal Government should as a matter of urgency review the Land Use Act in order to transfer more benefits to the communities in terms of ownership.

REFERENCES

1) Adaramola, Z. (2009). Amnesty may not end Niger Delta crisis. *Daily Trust Newspaper*, December 29, pp: 10.
2) Agbegbedia, O.A. (2014). Gender mainstreaming and the impacts of the federal government amnesty programme in the Niger Delta Region. *International Journal of Gender and Women's Studies. 2*(2):177-195
3) Ajaero, C. (2010). The Niger Delta Militants. *News Watch Magazine,* January 4, pp: 11-13.
4) Akanji, T.A., & Oyitso, M. (2012). Consumers' views of the strategies for promoting peace and sustainable development in the Niger Delta region. *Review of European Studies. 4*(2): 168-174.
5) Akinwale, A.A. (2010). Amnesty and human capital development agenda for the Niger Delta. *Journal of African Studies and Development*. 2(8):201-207.
6) Ako, R.O. (2011). The struggle for resource control and violence in the Niger Delta. In Obi, C & Rustad, S.A. (eds). *Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta Managing the Complex Politics of Petroviolence.* London and New York: Zed Book.
7) Akpan, F. & Ering, S.O. (2010). The politics of amnesty and oil-related conflict in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria. *European Journal of Social Science. 17*(2):146-153
8) Amadi, B. O., & Abdullah, H. (2012). Poverty alleviation through corporate social responsibility in Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Asian Social Science. 8*(4): 57-67.
9) Anele, K.A., & Omoro, J. (2012). Mobilizing the militants in the Niger Delta for national development: Prospects and challenges. *Journal of International Diversity. 12*(1):107-122.
10) Asuni, J.B. (2009). *Understanding the armed groups of the Niger Delta.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations Working Paper, September, accessed on May 3, 2016 at www.cfr.org/content/.../CFR_ Working paper_2_NigerDelta.pdf
11) Badmus, I.A. (2010). Oiling the guns and gunning for oil: Oil violence, arms proliferation and the destruction of Nigeria's Niger Delta. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences. 2*(1): 323-363.
12) Balouga, J. (2009). The Niger Delta: Defusing the Time Bomb. *First Quarter (International Association for Energy Economics*. 8-11.
13) Connors, W. & Swartz, S. (2009). Nigeria's amnesty programme draws criticism. *The Wall Street Journal.* August.
14) Duru, E.J.C & Ogbonnaya, U.M. (2012). The poverty of crisis management strategies in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A focus on the amnesty programme. *African Research Review: An International Multidisciplinary Journal, Ethiopia.* 6 (2):162-170.
15) Egwemi, V. (2010). From militancy to amnesty: Some thoughts on President Yar'adua's apparoach to the Niger Delta Crisis. *Current Research Journal of Economic Theory. 2(3): 136-141.*
16) Emuedo, C.O. (2013). Challenges to sustainable peace and security beyond the amnesty in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences.* 4(4):1-20.
17) Etekpe, A. (2012). Peace and development in Nigeria: The amnesty experience in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. *Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution*. 4(6):94-102.
18) Etemike, L. (2012). International dimension of the Niger Delta crisis: An insight into Nigeria's foreign policy challenges. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences. 4*(3):577-593.
19) Hazen, J.M. & Homer. J.(2007). *Small arms, armed violence, and insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in perspective,* Switzerland: Small Arms Survey.
20) Ibeanu, O. (2010). Insurgent, civil society and democracy in Nigeria: Ogoni encounters with the state, 1990-1998. *Research Report for ICSAG Programme of the Centre for Research and Documentation, (CRD),* Kano.
21) Idowu, O. F. (2012). Niger Delta crises: Implication for society and organizational effectiveness. *British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences, 7*(11):12-24
22) Ifeatu, A. (2010). Acquisition in post amnesty era. Accessed on April 20, 2016 from www.nigerdeltaonline.com
23) Ikelegbe, A. (2005). The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. *Nordic Journal of African Studies. 14*(2):208-234.
24) Ikelegbe, A.O. (2010). Oil, resource conflicts and the post-conflict transition in the Niger Delta region: Beyond the amnesty. *Monograph Series No. 3.* Benin City: Centre for Population and Environmental Development.
25) Jega, M. (2009). Amnesty: Off to a good start. *Daily Trust Newspaper,* October 7, pp: 2.
26) Kuku, K. (2012). *Remaking the Niger Delta: Challenges and opportunities.* Croydon: Mandingo Publishing.
27) Miall, H. (2004). *Conflict of transformation: a multi dimensional task.* Accessed on April 18. 2016 from http://www.berghofhandbook.net.
28) Moruku, R.K. (2012). The state, multinational oil companies and restiveness in the Niger Delta: Towards a holistic crisis management. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences. 3*(4): 883-914.
29) Nicholson, M. (1971). *Conflict analysis*. London: English University Press.
30) Nnorom, K & Odigbo, J. (2015). Amnesty programme and the challenge of poverty and insecurity in the Niger-Delta of Nigeria. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science.* 5(3):207-217.
31) .Nte, N.D., Eke, P. & Anele, A.(2010). Rural intelligence gathering and the challenges of counter insurgency: Views from the Niger Delta. *Bangladesh Journal of Sociology* 7(1), 21-32.

IJBAMR

32) Odubo, F.E. & Tobor, J.O. (2016). Nigeria's amnesty program: An educational and cultural perspective. *African Educational Research Journal.* 4(1): 1-7.
33) Ofehe, S.U. (2009). Interview: Amnesty best solution to militancy. *Daily Independent Newspaper*, July 23, pp: 4.
34) Ogege, S.O. (2011). Amnesty initiative and the Dilemma of sustainable development in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development. 4*(4): 249-258.
35) Ogbonnaya, U.M. (2011). Environmental law and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. *African Research Review*, 5(5).
36) Olojede, I.A., Fajonyomi, S.O., Akhakpe, I.B. & Mudasiru, (2000). Nigeria: Oil pollution, community dissatisfaction and threat to national peace and security. *African Association of Political Science Occassional Paper Series*. 4(3)
37) Oluduro, O. & Oluduro, O.F. (2012). Nigeria: In search of sustainable peace in the Niger Delta through the amnesty programme. *Journal of Sustainable Development, 5*(7):48-61.
38) Onuoha, K.M. (2004). Oil and gas exploration and production in Nigeria: Recent development and challenges ahead. *Paper presented at the 16th interdisciplinary Research Discourse of the postgraduate school,* University of Ibadan.
39) Otite, A, & Umukoro, N. (2010). Amnesty Programme and the Niger Delta: Overview of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) strategy for sustainable peace. *Africana (Special Issues)*. 2010: 1 – 22.
40) Paki, F.A.E, & Ebienfa, K..I. (2011). Military oil agitation in Nigeria's Niger Delta and the economy. *International Journal of Human & Social Sciences* 1(5), May,2011.
41) Sampson, I.T. (2013). The dilemmas of counter-BokoHaramism: Debating state responses to Boko Haram terrorism in northern Nigeria. *Security Journal.* 0955-1662:1-25.
42) Sayne, A. (2013). What next for security in the Niger Delta. *Special Report No. 333*. Washington, DC: USIP.
43) Slye, R.C. (2002). Legitimacy of amnesties under international law and general principles of Anglo-American law: Is a legitimate amnesty possible. *Virginia Journal of International Law. 43*(173): 174-248.
44) Uduagban, E. (2009). No more militants in Niger Delta. *Nigerian Tribune Newspaper,* October 5, pp: 49.
45) Ukiwo, U. (2015). Timing and sequencing in peacebuilding: The case of Nigeria's Niger Delta amnesty programme. *CRPD Working Paper No. 36*.
46) Vanessa, U. (2013). Nigeria's amnesty programme as a peacebuilding infrastructure: A silver bullet? *Journal of Peace building & Development*. 8(1):30-44
47) World Bank. (2003). *Global problems and local concern. pathways to a sustainable future: sustainable development in a dynamic world: Transforming institutions' growth and quality of life: world development report*. Washington DC: The World Bank.

IJBAMR